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THE LEMONS PROBLEM IN
CROWDFUNDING*
GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC**
ABSTRACT
Crowdfunding, an offshoot of crowdsourcing, is being touted as an
alternative to traditional sources of financing for small businesses. Despite all its promise, crowdfunding is not without potential problems.
To the extent feasible, these possible issues must be anticipated well in
advance so that crowdfunding can fulfil its goal of democratizing access
to capital.
This paper explores how asymmetrical information in the crowdfunding market can lead to a lemons problem, where high quality startups are driven out of the market by low quality projects. Understanding how the lemons problem can arise is critical in determining what
reforms are needed to ensure that small entrepreneurs will continue to
have the ability to raise money from the crowd.
Part I describes the crowdfunding process and focuses on the equity
crowdfunding model. By way of example, we study two popular equity
crowdfunding platforms: Grow VC and CrowdCube. Part II describes
how the lemons problem is creeping up in crowdsourcing, and explains
how a similar lemons problem can occur in crowdfunding. To help prevent information asymmetry, Part III proposes the use of reputation
systems, friendship networks, and discussion boards to signal or give
clues on the quality of a start-up. Part IV concludes.

*
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I. WHAT IS CROWDFUNDING?
A. OVERVIEW
Crowdfunding is the process of raising money from the crowd, usually through the use of social networks and dedicated platforms on the
Internet.1 It traces its roots to crowdsourcing, defined as “the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually an employee) and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of
people in the form of an open call.”2 Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia
produced by the mass collaboration of Netizens from all over the world,
is one of the most famous examples of how crowdsourcing works.3
Crowdfunding is not really a new phenomenon. The funds to build
the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty were raised among Americans
through crowdfunding. Donors were promised a six-inch statuette in
exchange for a one-dollar donation, while a five-dollar donation merited
a twelve-inch statuette.4 What is new is quickly reaching millions of
people at almost no cost through social networks, viral networking,
marketing, and other features of Web 2.0.5 Unlike traditional financing
models, like bank loans and venture capital where an entrepreneur has
to meet with potential backers to convince them of his project’s viability, crowdfunding allows an entrepreneur to solicit amounts through
the Internet from people that he has never met or may never meet. 6
Amounts raised from crowdfunding are also generally smaller than venture capital or angel investments.

1. Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert, & Armin Schwienbacher, Crowdfunding:
Tapping the Right Crowd, J. BUS. VENTURE (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578175.
2. Andy Ley & Scott Weaven, Exploring Agency Dynamics of Crowdfunding in
Start-up Capital Financing, 17 ACAD. ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 85, 86 (2011); Jeff Howe, The
Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, Jun. 2006, at 176, 178-79, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds_pr.html.
3. KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION: SOCIAL
NETWORKING MEETS VENTURE FINANCING 12 (2010).
4. Id.
5. Joachim Hemer, A Snapshot on Crowdfunding, ECONSTOR 8 (FraunhoferInstitut für System- und Innovationsforschung, Working Paper No. R2/2011, 2011), available at http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/52302/1/671522264.pdf.
6. Deborah A. Jacobs, The Trouble with Crowdfunding, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/04/17/the-trouble-with-crowdfunding/.

2013]

THE LEMONS PROBLEM IN CROWDFUNDING

255

Aside from the ease of raising funds quickly from large groups of
people, crowdfunding has non-financial benefits as well such as presales feedback, customer feedback, and word-of-mouth marketing.7 For
example, members of the public would be more likely to invest in a
product that they think would sell well or that they themselves would
buy.
Today, crowdfunding is being used in a wide array of fields—from
political fundraising to making movies to producing music.8 One of the
most famous platforms today is Kickstarter, where filmmakers, musicians, artists, and designers ask for donations from the public to fund
their creative projects. The FORM1 project, which aims to create an affordable 3D printer for the masses, raised $3 million on Kickstarter.9
Pebble, a wristwatch that connects with a smartphone wirelessly to
alert the user of incoming calls and messages, was unable to get additional funds through venture capitalists and angel investors, so it
turned to crowdfunding and raised over $10 million from almost 70,000
people.10 One source estimates that the value of crowdfunding transactions will double from $2.7 billion in 2012 to $5.1 billion in 2013.11
B. RATIONALE FOR CROWDFUNDING
1. Lack of Access to Traditional Sources of Capital
Small and micro-businesses, especially start-ups, are not always
able to access traditional sources of funding. To get a new venture off
the ground, entrepreneurs typically use personal funds, plus loans and
contributions from family and friends.12 However, many entrepreneurs,
“particularly those who are not in the upper and middle classes,”13 have
7. Dan Herman, Crowdfunding: Catalyzing Growth, Investment and Access to Capital,
DEEP
CENTRE
8
(Aug.
2013),
http://deepcentre.com/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/DEEP-Centre-August-2013-Crowdfunding-Catalyzing-growthinvestment-and-access-to-capital.pdf; see generally EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING NETWORK,
A FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING (2012).
8.
JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE
FUTURE OF BUSINESS 253 (2008).
9.
The Top 25 Crowdfunding Success Stories, ALLEY WATCH (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.alleywatch.com/2013/03/the-top-25-crowdfunding-success-stories/.
10. Id.
11. David Drake, U.S. Leads World in Burgeoning Crowdfunding Trend, FORBES
(Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/04/12/u-s-leads-world-inburgeoning-crowdfunding-trend/.
12. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 101 (2012).
13. Id.
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difficulty raising enough money from these personal sources.
Bank loans are typically out of reach for start-ups who have no collateral, credit history, or track record.14 Banks may also be reluctant to
lend to small projects during recessions or periods of slow economic
growth.15 Borrowing from a bank may even stifle the growth of a startup. Loan covenants may require that a high percentage of profits be
used to pay off debts instead of being reinvested in the company, or may
work to prevent the company from embarking on risky projects. 16
Even venture capitalists may not be as receptive to start-ups.
First, small businesses normally cannot scale quickly enough, or do not
offer the chance for a venture capitalist to exit quickly and profitably.17
Second, a venture capitalist invests between $2 million and $10 million
in a company, well beyond the capital required by a start-up.18 This is
not entirely an arbitrary decision on the part of a venture capitalist, because he may find that the transaction costs of funding a small business
do not justify the investment.19 Third, the entrepreneurs who need
funding are too many, while the venture capitalists are too few and
picky.20 The emergence of open-source tools, cloud computing, and virtual office infrastructure has made it cheaper to open an Internet company, but has also made it harder for companies to attract venture capital. Venture capital firms not only fund a project, but they usually also
make introductions, assist with product launching, and guide the venture at least for the first few years.21 Therefore, it is not surprising that
venture capitalists turn down ninety-nine percent of business proposals.22 Fourth, venture capital funding has also declined due to the
economic crunch. A report prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers reveals that seed investments in American start-ups declined by forty
14. Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exception? Online Investment Crowdfunding
and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 70 (2011).
15. Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?,
2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 60-61 (1998).
16. Id.
17. David Lavinsky, Funding Fathers, SMART BUSINESS (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://www.sbnonline.com/2010/08/funding-fathers-the-birth-of-business-crowdfunding-isproviding-new-ways-to-get-money/.
18. Bradford, supra note 12, at 102.
19. Id.
20. Lavinsky, supra note 17; see Burkett, supra note 14, at 70.
21. DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, MACROWIKINOMICS – REBOOTING
BUSINESS AND THE WORLD 50 (2010).
22. Bradford, supra note 12, at 103.
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percent in the final quarter of 2011, and by forty-eight percent for the
entire 2011,23 although, there was some recovery in 2012.24 Due to the
recession, fewer companies are going public, and it is feared that the
United States fiscal crisis could further disrupt financial markets. 25
This means that venture capitalists have no choice but to lock in their
money longer than usual in their existing ventures, instead of injecting
capital into new start-ups.26 Angel investors—rich individuals with extensive entrepreneurial experience—may be more willing to invest in
start-ups than venture capitalists. However, there are far fewer angel
investors compared to the number of proposed projects, and they also
tend to focus on larger projects (i.e., projects that are “high-growth [and]
high-return”27). Finally, raising capital through an initial public offering is simply out of reach for most start-ups. Transaction costs and the
costs of complying with securities registration requirements are formidable for small businesses.28 Start-ups may also be unable to attract
23. Tom Foremski, Are VCs Abandoning Seed Funding? Report Shows Massive 48%
Dive
in
One
Year,
SILICON
VALLEY
WATCHER
(Jan.
20,
2012),
http://www.siliconvalleywatcher.com/mt/archives/2012/01/startupwatch_ar.php.
24. Martin Zwilling, Seed and Later Investments for Startups are Booming, FORBES
(Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2013/01/18/seed-and-laterinvestments-for-startups-are-booming/.
25. US Debt Crisis Can Cause Global Financial Turmoil: IMF, ECONOMIC TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international-business/usdefault-would-likely-cause-recession-or-worse-imf/articleshow/23735274.cms.
26. TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 51.
27. Bradford, supra note 12, at 103.
28. In the United States, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act exempts
small crowdfunded offerings from federal registration requirements, subject to certain
conditions. Among other requirements, crowdfunded offerings must:
 Offering Limit: Raise capital of not more than $1 million in any 12-month period;
 Sell to any one investor, within any 12-month period:
– Up to $2,000 or 5 percent (whichever is greater) of the investor's annual
income or net worth, as applicable, if the investor has annual income or net
worth of less than $100,000, or
– Up to 10% of the investor's annual income or net worth, up to a maximum
of $100,000 if the investor has an annual income and net worth of more than
$100,000.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106 (2012). For a discussion of
the JOBS Act, see, e.g., Maryam K. Ansari, Is JOBS Act Actually Good For Small Business?, FINDLAW (Apr. 16, 2012, 8:43 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/
tagblogsfindlawcom2012-freeenterprise-idUS21 1615233420120416.
Nevertheless, the JOBS Act requires a start-up to file a report with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (“US SEC”) prior to offering to investors, as well as annual
reports and any other documents that the US SEC may require. Therefore, even with the
JOBS Act, start-ups are still subject to significant reporting requirements.
Moreover, the rules approved by the US SEC in July 2013 for Title II of the JOBS Act
only allow solicitation to accredited investors. Under the rules, a person is an accredited
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the attention of reputable underwriters who can price, sell, and organize a public offering. In addition, “the risks associated with investment
in a small business, including agency costs and informational asymmetries, as well as the basic uncertainty associated with the development
of unproven products or services, are likely to render the cost of passive
equity investments too high.”29
2. Reduced Transaction Costs
Before the advent of the Internet, informational inefficiency
plagued small businesses. This meant that even if funding was available, it was difficult to match entrepreneurs with funders.30 Contacting
at least twenty active investors would have taken at least four
months.31 Raising small amounts of money from numerous investors in
diverse locations from all over the globe would have been almost impossible.

investor if he or she has either:
 An individual net worth or joint net worth with a spouse that exceeds $1 million at the time of the purchase, excluding the value (and any related indebtedness) of a primary residence; or
 An individual annual income that exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most
recent years or a joint annual income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those
years, and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year.
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Eliminating the Prohibition on General Solicitation and General Advertising in Certain Offerings (July 10, 2013) (on file with SEC),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item1.htm.
Because of their net worth or income, these individuals are presumed to be sophisticated investors. However, the pool of accredited investors, as defined above, is small.
Moreover, not all countries exempt crowdfunding from the usual registration requirements for initial public offerings. For instance, Canada has no national law similar to the
JOBS Act that exempts crowdfunding from many securities registration requirements.
See, e.g., Christine Dobby, A Case for Crowdfunding, FINANCIAL POST (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://business.financialpost.com/2012/04/18/a-case-for-crowdfunding/. Recently, a few
provinces in Canada have approved or proposed different crowdfunding frameworks, but
these cover only issuers or investors within the said provinces. John Wires, Canadian
Regulators Heading Different Directions on Equity Crowdfunding,
NATIONAL
CROWDFUNDING ASSOCIATION OF CANADA (Jul. 25, 2013), http://www.ncfacanada.org/ canadian-regulators-heading-different-directions-on-equity-crowdfunding/.
29. Fisch, supra note 15, at 61.
30. Bradford, supra note 12, at 101.
31. Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder's Guide to General Solicitation and Title II of
the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013
/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/2/.
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However, the development of Web 2.0, a Web-as-participationplatform, has facilitated access to networks of investors or consumers
from around the world32 and reduced the transaction costs associated
with start-up funding.33 Through Web 2.0, an entrepreneur can “in real
time and with no incremental cost . . . [sell] to literally millions of potential investors . . . [who have] access to nearly unlimited information
in selecting among potential investments.”34
As Yannis Bakos explains, a market has three main functions:
“matching buyers and sellers; facilitating the exchange of information,
goods, services, and payments associated with market transactions; and
providing an institutional infrastructure such as a legal and regulatory
framework that enables the efficient functioning of the market.” 35
Crowdfunding platforms leverage the Internet “to perform these functions with increased effectiveness and reduced transaction costs, resulting in more efficient, ‘friction-free’ markets.”36
In addition, crowdfunding disintermediates traditional financing
channels.37 For instance, banks pool funds of their depositors and then
lend these funds to entrepreneurs. In crowdfunding, entrepreneurs go
straight to the would-be depositors to request funds, and avoid the
transactions costs associated with using banks.
3. Diversity of Investments
In addition to enabling start-ups to raise funds from nontraditional sources, “crowdfunding provides a new outlet for the capital
of ardent consumer-investors on the Internet.”38 Crowdfunders may
choose to fund projects, which conventional financiers may find “too
risky, unpredictable, [or] just plain bizarre,”39 or perhaps, too poorly
presented.40 “These crowdfunded ventures may be more welfareenhancing or more successful in their relevant product or service markets than businesses and projects funded through standard venture
capital financings.”41 Thus, crowdfunding targets small businesses,
32. Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, supra note 1.
33. Bradford, supra note 12, at 5.
34. Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 6 (2007).
35. Yannis Bakos, The Emerging Role of Electronic Marketplaces on the Internet,
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Aug. 1998, at 35.
36. Id.
37. Herman, supra note 7.
38. Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 931-32 (2011).
39. Burkett, supra note 14, at 70.
40. Hemer, supra note 5, at 2.
41. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 38, at 932.
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which are typically underserved or not served at all by traditional financing sources.42
On a typical crowdfunding website, an entrepreneur describes his
proposed product and business plan, and lists what people can receive
in exchange for their contributions.43 Investors choose projects that appeal to them, decide how much they wish to chip in, and send in the
chosen amount. The crowdfunding portal usually receives the initial
contributions from, and releases the promised proceeds back to, the investors on behalf of the entrepreneur.44
C. THE EQUITY MODEL OF CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding models can be classified based on what investors
stand to gain: (1) the donation model;45 (2) the reward model;46 (3) the
pre-purchase model;47 (4) the lending model;48 and (5) the equity model.
We focus on the equity model in this paper.49 Under this model, investors are promised a share of the profits or equity in the business.50
The equity crowdfunding model is currently less popular in the United
States than elsewhere, due to concerns regarding the securities laws.51

42. Admittedly, venture capitalists and angel investors may provide more than just
financing. For instance, they may dispense valuable advice and monitor the performance
of these start-ups. However, as argued by C. Steven Bradford in his article, Crowdfunding
and the Federal Securities Laws, crowdfunding is not a substitute for venture capital or
angel investing because it is aimed at entrepreneurs who would not have been served by
venture capitalists and angel investors in the first place. See Bradford, supra note 12, at
104.
43. See id. at 1, 10.
44. See id.
45. Under this model, funders receive nothing in exchange for their contributions.
46. Under this model, investors are offered rewards, but such rewards do not take
the form of a stake in the business or a share in the earnings. Acknowledgment or recognition of the investor on the website is one example of a reward. Kickstarter is a famous
example, where funders of a movie or film might be invited to the initial screening.
47. Funders receive the product being made, or to be made, by the start-up, in exchange for their contributions.
48. Investors loan funds, in exchange for repayment of the principal, with or without interest. This model is also called peer-to-peer lending, or social lending. See
TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 54-56.
49. For a more detailed discussion of the four other kinds, see Bradford, supra note
12 at 1, 14-27.
50. See id. at 1, 10.
51. Id.
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It is perhaps no accident that famous equity-based crowdfunding platforms like Grow VC and CrowdCube are based outside the United
States. Although with the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act, the equity crowdfunding model may increase in
popularity in the United States.52
1. Grow VC
Grow VC, a Hong Kong-based platform, was launched in February
2010.53 There are no membership fees and the network is open to anyone. Funders can make micro-investments into their chosen start-ups
starting from twenty dollars a month, or make larger direct investments from their personal capital.54
The Grow VC website displays descriptions of project proponents
and their business plans, the history of each start-up, and funds raised
to date by each venture, together with members’ feedback and replies.55
Only if the target amount for a pitch is reached will the proponent actually receive the funds.56
Grow VC provides a standard term sheet for micro-investments,
which is the starting point for negotiating the terms and conditions of
direct investments.57 Micro-investors are rewarded based on criteria
such as timing of selection58 (i.e., those who invested earlier may reap
higher returns). For direct investments, the return on investment is
distributed to investors according to their agreement with the startup.59 Thus, under Grow VC’s business models, members are trained to
identify and choose projects that will eventually succeed.60 According to
a report released by Grow VC, startups can raise up to $1,000,000 on

52. The US SEC has not yet issued rules for Title III of the JOBS Act, which governs crowdfunding. Until such final rules are issued (estimated to be in 2014), crowdfunding is not permitted in the United States. See Barnett, supra note 31.
53. See Burkett, supra note 14, at 75-78.
54. For Investors, GROW VC, http://www.growvc.com/main/tour/for-investors/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2014).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. How
do
I
negotiate
terms
and
conditions?,
GROW
VC,
http://www.growvc.com/help/2010/06/09/how-do-i-negotiate-terms-and-conditions/
(last
visited Jan. 30, 2014).
58. How
does
ROI
work
for
investments?,
GROW
VC,
http://www.growvc.com/help/2011/03/22/how-does-roi-work-for-investments/ (last visited
Jan. 30, 2014).
59. How
does
ROI
work
for
investments?,
GROW
VC,
http://www.growvc.com/help/2011/03/22/how-does-roi-work-for-investments/ (last visited
Jan. 30, 2014).
60. See Burkett, supra note 14, at 75-78.
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their platform from over 12,000 registered users.61 If a startup is successful, it will pay GrowVC transaction management fees, which is two
and one-half percent of the raised capital.62 For micro-investors,
GrowVC gets commissions only on the returns (i.e., only if the startup
generates returns).63 There are no commissions on direct investments.64
2. CrowdCube
CrowdCube is another crowdfunding portal, based in the United
Kingdom.65 Since it was established in February 2011, CrowdCube has
funded sixty-four pitches, with an average amount invested of £2,700
(approximately U.S. $4,300).66 It has 43,224 members who have invested a total of £18,948,529 (approximately U.S. $30,000,000).67
On the CrowdCube website, entrepreneurs pitch their business
ideas online. CrowdCube provides a discussion forum for each business
pitch. On these discussion boards, the entrepreneur can answer questions, and members can discuss the project amongst themselves. 68
Funders can contribute as low as £10 (approximately U.S. $16).69 The
pitches that each member has invested in are displayed in the member’s public profile, but the amount invested in each pitch is not displayed.70 Investors are given shares or equity in the business and possibly rewards, such as discounts on future purchases of the product.71
The majority of shares issued are B shares, or non-voting shares.72
61. GROW VC, http://www.growvc.com/main/media/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
62. Closing Process Fees, GROW VC, http://www.growvc.com/help/2011/04/03/shouldi-pay-some-additional-costs/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
63. What
Commission
Does
Grow
VC
take?,
GROW
VC,
http://www.growvc.com/help/2010/08/04/what-commission-does-grow-vc-take/ (last visited
Jan. 30, 2014).
64. Id.
65. It is currently limited to investors with a UK residential address and bank account. FAQ, CROWDCUBE, http://www.CrowdCube.com/pg/CrowdCube-faq-20 (last visited
Jan. 30, 2014).
66. CrowdCube Infographic, CROWDCUBE, http://www.CrowdCube.com/infographic
(last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
67. Id.
68. FAQ, supra note 65.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Each project is given up to sixty days to reach its target investment or
fundraising goal.73 If there are not enough contributions to reach the
entrepreneur’s target amount, all investments are returned to the investors.74 For each successful pitch, CrowdCube deducts a success fee of
five percent of the target amount,75 and charges legal fees of £1750 (approximately U.S. $2,800).76 There are no fees if a pitch is not successful.77
II. THE LEMONS PROBLEM IN CROWDFUNDING
A. THE LEMONS PROBLEM IN GENERAL
The lemons problem, articulated by Nobel Prize winner George
Akerlof, is a familiar issue in markets with asymmetric information,
that is, markets in which sellers know the quality of the goods they are
offering, but buyers do not.78 Buyers are aware that some of the goods
in the market are of good quality, while the rest are of bad quality
(“lemons”).79 However, if buyers cannot observe quality, they cannot
distinguish between good and bad quality products. Thus, buyers will
not be willing to pay a high price for a good, simply because they do not
know if that item is indeed of high quality. In short, buyers are prepared to pay only a price “which reflects the average quality of all units
on the market.”80 This price rewards the sellers of low quality goods,
but is unacceptable to sellers of high quality goods. The latter, unable
to secure the correct price for their goods, will not participate in the
market.81 As more high quality sellers exit the market, the expected
average price goes down. In the end, high quality units are driven from
the market, and only the “lemons” are left.82

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970).
79. John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission and the Professions: A
Quarter Century of Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 997,
1001 (2005).
80. Id.
81. Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, Reputation in an Internet Auction
Market, 40 ECON. INQUIRY 633, 634 (2002).
82. See Kwoka, Jr., supra note 79, at 1001-02.
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It is even possible that no market will exist in the long run. As explained by Akerlof:
(I)n a more continuous case with different grades of goods, even worse
pathologies can exist. For it is quite possible to have the bad driving
out the not-so-bad driving out the medium driving out the not-so-good
driving out the good in such a sequence of events that no market exists at all.83

An alternative (but no less pessimistic) scenario is painted by economics professor Kwoka, Jr: in markets where quality is endogenous
(i.e., under the control of the provider), sellers who would have sold high
quality goods may lower the quality of their products “to avoid being
driven out of the market entirely.”84
B. THE LEMONS PROBLEM IN CROWDSOURCING OF LABOR
Panos Ipeirotis, an associate professor at New York University, has
suggested that there could be a lemons problem in crowdsourcing, specifically, in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (“AMT”) platform. 85 The AMT
platform works as follows:
Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform (‘AMT’) exemplifies the cognitive
piecework model of crowdsourcing. Firms register on AMT to access
an immense pool of workers (called ‘Providers’), estimated at 200,000
in total. The firms (called ‘Requesters’) post “Human Intelligence
Tasks” (or ‘HITs’), which typically involve basic computing and language skills, such as tagging photos according to their content, rewriting sections of prose, transcribing audio, choosing representative
screenshots from a short video clip, responding to survey questions,
translating text, or performing internet research. Anywhere from
20,000 to 100,000 HITs are available at one time, and Requesters post
20,000 to 40,000 new HITs every day.86

83.
84.
85.

See Akerlof, supra note 78, at 490.
Kwoka, Jr., supra note 79, at 1001-02.
Panos Ipeirotis, Mechanical Turk, Low Wages, and the Market for Lemons, A
COMPUTER SCIENTIST IN A BUSINESS SCHOOL (July 27, 2010), http://www.behind-theenemy-lines.com/2010/07/mechanical-turk-low-wages-and-market.html; see also Karen
Fort, Gilles Adda, & K. Bretonnel Cohen, Amazon Mechanical Turk: Gold Mine or Coal
Mine?, 37 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 413, 418 (2011).
86. Alek Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor Law in the
Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 148 (2011).
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According to Ipeirotis, wages at AMTs are very low, and in fact,
wages of one dollar or lower are prevalent.87 He explains that, as in the
real world, when a new employee starts work, the employer usually
tests the incoming employee to ensure the quality of his work.88 Both
high and low quality workers receive a low salary during this testing
period.89 Ideally, in time, the high quality workers are able to prove
their worth, and their salaries are adjusted upwards.
Similarly, in AMTs, Requesters are unable to distinguish between
low and high quality Providers before the Providers work on a task. 90
Thus, Requesters pay everyone as if they are low quality workers (i.e.,
with low wages).91 The result is that good Providers are “doomed to receive the same level of compensation”92 as the bad Providers, and are
“drowning in the anonymity of the crowd.”93
To be fair, Requesters can require Providers to pass certain qualification tests before they can work on HITs, limit Providers to those within a certain location, or require that they must have completed a minimum number of HITs.94 In addition, a Provider is paid only when his
work is approved by a Requester.95 However, verifying the quality of
work performed by a Provider takes time and entails expenses.96 These
costs could very well approximate the cost of the Requester performing
the task itself, which negates the very advantage of crowdsourcing:
providing work at lower costs.97

87. Panos Ipeirotis, Does Lack of Reputation Help the Crowdsourcing Industry?, A
COMPUTER SCIENTIST IN A BUSINESS SCHOOL (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.behind-theenemy-lines.com/2011/11/does-lack-of-reputation-help.html.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; Ipeirotis, supra note 85; see also Fort, Adda, & Cohen, supra note 85, at 418.
91. Ipeirotis, supra note 85; see also Fort, Adda & Cohen, supra note 85, at 418; Ipeirotis, supra note 87.
92. Ipeirotis, supra note 87.
93. Id.
94. How It Works, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://requester.mturk.com/
tour/how_it_works (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
95. Id.
96. Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Foster Provost, & Jing Wang, Quality Management on
Amazon Mechanical Turk, Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Computation, 1 (2010), available at http://www.misrc.umn.edu/workshops/2012/fall
/Ipeirotis.pdf.
97. Id.
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C. THE LEMONS PROBLEM IN CROWDFUNDING
A lemons problem similar to that in crowdsourcing may arise in
crowdfunding. There are high quality entrepreneurs and low quality
entrepreneurs. A fraudulent entrepreneur could lure funders to invest
in his project, and subsequently disappear with the funds, never to be
heard from again. An entrepreneur may also exaggerate the projected
returns on his project, and other promoters may be led to similarly puff
up their prospects to attract investors. 98 The result would be “a crowdfunding market full of unrealistic, and likely fraudulent, sales pitches.”99 Founders may also unfairly extract value from the business by
paying themselves inordinately high salaries or charging personal expenses to company funds.100
Whether an entrepreneur or a project is good or bad constitutes information that is largely hidden from funders. A start-up takes some
time before it can generate revenue. Thus, a funder not only has to contribute money before he can participate in a venture, he may have to
wait for years before he can determine if he will get a return on his investment. In a worst-case scenario, the investment may turn out to be
a total hoax and he may be unable to track down the entrepreneur, who
may well be located in a different jurisdiction.101
To be fair, dishonest and unscrupulous entrepreneurs have existed
in the offline world, even before the advent of Web 2.0. However, because crowdfunding is done through the Internet, investors are more
likely to be in a jurisdiction different from that of the entrepreneur.
This makes it more difficult to obtain redress against swindlers. 102 Also, because funds can be raised more quickly through the Internet, a
fraudster may have already absconded with the money before the government authorities can be alerted. Moreover, “electronic markets introduce additional inefficiencies, as participants can change their
names, such as with a different free e-mail service, thereby shedding

98. Burkett, supra note 14, at 97.
99. Id. at 97-98.
100. Daniel Isenberg, The Road to Crowdfunding Hell, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
BLOG NETWORK (Apr. 23, 2012), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/04/the_road_to_crowd funding_hell.html.
101. Toshio Yamagishi et al., Solving the Lemons Problem with Reputation, ETRUST:
FORMING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 73 (Karen S. Cook et al. eds. 2009) (citations omitted).
102. Fisch, supra note 15, at 81.
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negative reputation and associated repercussions.”103 Thus,
“[c]ompanies with small capitalizations present disproportionate risks
of . . . fraud”104 because the “low cost and wide distribution”105 of business pitches over the Internet may magnify the risks of fraud. Thus,
online investors face greater uncertainty than investors in offline brick
and mortar businesses. “The high level of information asymmetry” 106 in
crowdfunding “creates a situation ripe for fraud, embezzlement, and the
lemons problem.”107 Hence, in the crowdfunding market, investors may
be unable to tell which start-ups are fraudulent, and will therefore reduce the amount they are willing to invest.108 Honest and high quality
entrepreneurs may exit the market, which further reduces the price
that investors are willing to invest.109
Even without fraud or dishonesty on the part of both entrepreneurs
and investors, the lemons problem may still arise. Entrepreneurs inevitably have more information on the workings and the prospects of their
projects. At the start of a project, “[v]irtually all of the important decisions bearing on the company's success remain to be made, and most of
the significant uncertainties concerning the outcome of the company's
efforts remain unresolved.”110 Once the venture is up and running, “uncertainty concerning future performance is magnified.”111 Certainly,
the project plan posted on the crowdfunding platform cannot be too accurate, as such a business plan is little more than an educated guess.112
There may be uncertainties as to whether the proposed product will
perform as expected or whether it will be received by its target market
as hoped. Any available information at the time of investment is soft
information (i.e., “not easily observable by an investor and difficult for
an entrepreneur to communicate credibly”113). “In short, the entrepreneur holds all the cards. Investors have little information about what is
to come and little control over what the entrepreneur does.”114

103. McDonald & Slawson, supra note 81, at 634.
104. Fisch, supra note 15, at 58.
105. Id.
106. Yamagishi et al., supra note 101, at 73.
107. Id.
108. Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of
Small Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 38 (1998).
109. Id. at 38-39.
110. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076–77 (2003).
111. Id. at 1076.
112. Abraham J. B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations
Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 121-22 (2010).
113. Id. at 122.
114. Bradford, supra note 12, at 107.
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In fact, even if the entrepreneur wanted to disclose as much information as possible, it may not always be wise for him to be too specific
or too detailed in his project pitch. Because he will post his project
pitch on the crowdfunding website, his business plan is accessible to the
world. Contrast this with the situation in traditional financing, where
the entrepreneur presents his idea to a limited group of banks, venture
capitalists and/or angel investors.115 Also, in traditional financing, the
entrepreneur can normally ask all potential investors (who are usually
few) to sign non-disclosure agreements. It would be impractical for an
entrepreneur on a crowdfunding platform to ask every person viewing
his pitch to sign a non-disclosure agreement,116 and unrealistic to assume that he can monitor and determine if another entrepreneur has
stolen his idea. Thus, the risk of somebody else stealing his idea may
be aggravated in crowdfunding.
Assuming that the entrepreneur could safely disclose all information to potential funders, the average investor on the crowdfunding
platform may not be able to fully comprehend all information. After all,
“investors are not specialists and thus have access to less information
about the industry, past performance of the entrepreneur, and many
other pieces of value-relevant information.”117 The fact that start-up
businesses are smaller and have little or no track record makes it harder for funders to independently verify the information offered by the entrepreneurs.118
Thus, due to information asymmetry (whether or not caused by
fraud or dishonesty), funders cannot easily tell good investments from
bad, so they will “discount all the opportunities or price them all as mediocre.”119 High quality start-ups would be reluctant to accept discounted prices, and over time, may desert the crowdfunding market. 120
The lemons problem may be intensified by the fact that there are
hardly any barriers to entering the crowdfunding platform market. Absence of substantial barriers to entry may lead to “a flood of projects of
115. Armin Schwienbacher & Benjamin Larralde, Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE (manuscript at 10) (on file
with author) (forthcoming).
116. Hemer, supra note 5, at 28.
117. Schwienbacher & Larralde, supra note 115.
118. Choi, supra note 108, at 38.
119. Cable, supra note 112, at 122.
120. Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Dec.
2000, at 45, 47.
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all kinds of quality [that will overtake] . . . the site.”121 If a potential investor has to spend much time and effort to study each project and form
opinions on: (i) whether the entrepreneur is giving a complete and accurate description of the project; (ii) whether the product or service will be
well-received by its target market; and (iii) whether his return on that
project will be high enough to entice him to invest, it degrades user experience and discourages him from participating in future fundraising.122
Furthermore, peer effects may worsen the lemons problem. Investors may be unusually responsive to decisions of other investors, that is,
they contribute more when a project successfully fundraises, and are
swayed into investing into the most popular projects.123 This is not surprising, because crowdfunding may be classified as an experience
good,124 meaning that funders can confirm the quality of an investment
only after they invest and after sufficient time has elapsed for the venture to turn in a profit. Thus, crowdfunders look at related projects and
at the actions of other crowdfunders in deciding whether to invest.125 If
a potential funder hears of another investor being the victim of a scam
or losing his money in a crowdfunding venture, he will more likely shy
away from crowdfunding altogether.126 In fact, even mere perceptions
of dishonesty in the market may decrease investor confidence and cause
potential funders to stay away.127

121. Bakor Al-Tayar, Exploring the Characteristics and Use of Online Profile Based
Crowdfunding 57 (Dec. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available
at
http://www.crowdsourcing.org/document/exploring-the-characteristics-and-use-ofonline-profile-based-crowdfunding/10297.
122. Id.
123. Chris Ward & Vandana Ramachandran, Crowdfunding the Next Hit: Microfunding Online Experience Goods 4, available at http://people.cs.umass.edu/~wallach/
workshops/nips2010css/papers/ward.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
124. Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 311
(1970); Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, supra note 1.
125. Ward & Ramachandran, supra note 123.
126. In early August 2012, the Massachusetts Securities Division charged a Lowell,
Massachusetts man for collecting $153,396 from twenty people who were led to believe
that they were investing in a gaming site. This led the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
who brought the case, to warn the US SEC of the pitfalls of relying on the wisdom of the
crowds. Beth Pinsker Gladstone, Crowdfunding Scams Top Investor Threat: Regulators,
REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/21/us-investing-scamsthreats-idUSBRE87K17W20120821. Although it is not clear if news of this crowdfunding
scam has deterred investors, the warning by the Secretary of the Commonwealth is one
example of how one scam can prompt the government to be wary of crowdfunding in general. Id.
127. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 38, at 936.
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE LEMON PROBLEM
A. REPUTATION AS A SIGNALLING DEVICE
According to economist Michael Spence, the lemons problem identified by Akerlof can be mitigated by “signalling.”128 For instance, in a job
market, employers who normally could not distinguish between high
and low quality workers can look at an employee’s education as a signal
of quality.129 Thus, education as a signal can mitigate the information
asymmetry in the job market.130
A reputation or ratings system can similarly mitigate the information asymmetry in the crowdfunding market by reducing uncertainty
on the part of investors and thus, allow a market for quality goods. 131
Signals regarding the quality of a start-up can be transmitted to investors via a reputation or ratings system, similar to the ratings system on
Internet auction markets like eBay and marketplaces like Amazon.com.
Reputation systems mimic “how reputation is built in the real
world; by collecting information on the past behavior of a seller (or buyer) and making this information available to future transaction partners.”132 In the world of Web 2.0, the costs of tallying, displaying, and
distributing this information is almost, if not, zero, and this information
can be transmitted to millions of people around the world almost instantaneously.133 For instance, a study of eBay auctions confirms the
value of reputation systems in online markets:

128. Mingfeng Lin, Siva Viswanathan, & N. R. Prabhala, Judging Borrowers by the
Company They Keep: Friendship Networks and Information Asymmetry in Online Peerto-Peer Lending (July 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Western Finance
Association), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1355679; Michael Spence, Job Market
Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355, 355 (1973).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. McDonald & Slawson, supra note 81, at 634; Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler,
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615
(1981); Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON.
828 (1989); Carl Shapiro, Premiums for High Quality Products as returns to Reputations,
98 Q. J. ECON. 659 (1983).
132. Al-Tayar, supra note 121, at 67.
133. Id. at 57.
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Higher reputation sellers experience higher auction prices, ceteris paribus. Our findings suggest that repeat players are rewarded for
building reputation. Consistent with the belief that the highreputation seller’s value of future transactions outweighs the value of
taking advantage of the buyer in the current transaction, buyers are
willing to pay more to a higher-reputation seller.134

As applied to crowdfunding, entrepreneurs with good ratings from
community members can command higher prices135 or solicit more contributions, because a significant proportion of investors may be willing
to pay a premium for dealing with such well-regarded entrepreneurs.136
In fact, the mere act of agreeing to be rated (when ratings are optional) may help convey high quality, even before ratings are available.137 Other ways of signalling quality are using “one’s real name, rather than a pseudonym, and . . . [indicating] on a Web site that one also
has a physical store with its attendant overhead costs.”138
A few crowdfunding platforms have in fact begun to use reputation
or ratings systems. For instance, Grow VC allows investors to view the
ratings of entrepreneurs. Users can express a positive opinion on a
start-up (which increases the reputation of that start-up), or express a
negative opinion (which decreases the reputation of that start-up). Users can further evaluate a start-up, by rating the start-up from one to
five (five being the highest) on criteria such as “How ingenious and
competitive is the . . . [proposed product or service]?” At the evaluator’s
option, the results of the evaluation can be anonymized from the public,
or from the public and the start-up. However, there appears to be no
similar rating or reputation system on CrowdCube.
Ratings take on even more importance considering that most
crowdfunding platforms do not guarantee the performance of their
listed start-ups. While Grow VC performs a preliminary review of any
proposed business plan, it makes an express disclaimer:
GROW VC does not evaluate or endorse any of the opportunities submitted by the Entrepreneurs nor does it make any recommendations
regarding the appropriateness of particular opportunities for any
Funder. GROW VC makes no independent investigations to verify the
factual information submitted to the Funder and GROW VC makes no
representations or warranties with respect to the information
134. McDonald & Slawson, supra note 81, at 634.
135. As used in this paper, higher prices can be in the form of giving less equity to an
investor in exchange for the same amount of contribution. For instance, instead of giving
two common shares in the enterprise in exchange for every $100 contributed, the investor
will be given only one common share.
136. Resnick, supra note 120.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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provided by the Entrepreneurs. As a result, Funders must conduct
their own investigation of the merits and risks of each opportunity,
and negotiate the terms of their investment in any such opportunity.
All Funders are strongly encouraged to seek legal and other professional counsel prior to making such investments.139

CrowdCube also performs an initial review of each entrepreneur,
but issues the same disclaimer to funders:
Whilst CrowdCube does vet businesses before they are listed on
CrowdCube, investors should call upon their own judgement,
knowledge and research along with that of the Crowd (other Investors
within CrowdCube) to decide whether the Entrepreneur is worthy of
their investment.140

Thus, when a crowdfunding platform does not screen, or performs
only a cursory study of start-ups, the power of the crowd to distinguish
between good and bad investments can be harnessed.141
139. GROW VC, supra note 54.
140. CROWDCUBE, supra note 66.
141. Some crowdfunding platforms take a more active part in screening project
pitches. For instance, the Swiss site Investiere, which claims that it is a hybrid model
with a more traditional venture capital approach, performs the following four-stage vetting:
Step 1: Screening: Pre-selection of projects based on defined criteria: industry, team,
capital need, stage, domicile.
Step 2: Curation: by network of industry experts who analyze market potential of the
product, realistic business approach, and team capabilities and network.
Step 3: Structured due diligence with additional emphasis on team and further thirdparty opinions. Meetings and interviews are usually arranged between the experts of Investiere and the project proponents.
Step 4: Deal set-up: Elaboration and refinement of company profile and investment
proposal, plus a short video production to introduce the team and product. See Our Selection Process, INVESTIERE, https://www.investiere.ch/content/our-selection-process (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). Despite all these screenings, all investors are required to agree to the
following terms and conditions prior to registration on the website:
3.2. Investors take all investment decisions in reliance on her or his own judgment and VERVE does not advice on the merits or sustainability of any transaction. Any investment idea is given without any representations, warranty or
guarantee as to the accuracy or completeness of such information.
3.3. Investors understand that investments involve significant risks and the value of any investment may in- or decrease. No assurance can be given that the investment objective of any investment proposal will be achieved or that substantial losses will not be suffered. ANY INVESTMENT FACILITATED THROUGH
THE WEBSITE MAY LOSE SOME OR ALL OF ITS VALUE AT ANY POINT.
Terms of Use, INVESTIERE, https://www.investiere.ch/legal (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
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To be sure, reputation systems are not without their share of problems. Paul Resnick et al. enumerated three challenges in Internet reputation systems:
 eliciting feedback (e.g., there is little incentive for participants to
provide feedback);
 distributing feedback (e.g., it is difficult, if not impossible, to transfer user ratings from one website to another); and
 aggregating and displaying feedback (e.g., ratings do not factor in
the reputations of the people giving feedback).142

However, these challenges are not insurmountable.143 For instance, feedback from more active members could be given more weight,
as opposed to opinions of new or less active members. Thus, members
will have incentives to evaluate other members, because the more active they are in the crowdfunding platform, the more weight will be given to their ratings, and the better their reputation will be.
Another common problem with reputation systems is that some
people can freely change their user and profile names, or easily switch
to another crowdfunding platform. This allows them to erase the effect
of any prior negative feedback given to them in a crowdfunding platform. However, this issue may be managed by using a positive reputation system.
Peter Kollock, a social psychologist, explains the two kinds of reputation systems, a positive system and a negative system, as follows:
A positive system evaluates traders only in the positive direction. A
new entrant receives a neutral reputation of zero, the lowest possible
level given that all evaluations are positive. A negative reputation
system, by contrast, evaluates only in the negative direction . . .
(T)raders who have acquired a negative reputation have an incentive
to change their identity and re-enter the market with a fresh reputation score of zero. Under such a system, therefore, reputation does not
accumulate. On the other hand, traders under the positive system
have incentives to maintain their reputation because a positive reputation is a valuable asset . . . (T)he freedom to change identities does
not affect the effectiveness of the positive system given that traders
voluntarily keep their brand name once they have acquired a good
reputation.144

142.
143.
144.

Resnick, supra note 120, at 47-48.
Id. at 47.
Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, in 16 ADVANCES IN
GROUP PROCESSES 99-123 (E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thye, & H. A. Walker eds. 1999);
Yamagishi et al., supra note 101, at 73, 76.
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To understand why positive reputation is useful in online trading,
we need to realize that there are two functions of reputation: exclusion
and inclusion. The power of negative reputations is based on the principle of exclusion. Negative reputations exclude dishonest traders from
the market. The power of positive reputations, in contrast, is based on
the principle of inclusion. Positive reputations are not effective for excluding dishonest traders from the market. However, positive reputations are useful in attracting potential trading partners.145
By relying more on positive reputation and less on negative reputation (which can be easily escaped on the Internet by simply changing
one’s username), funders can more easily avoid unscrupulous entrepreneurs masquerading under a new username and choose truthful entrepreneurs with positive reputations.
B. SOCIAL NETWORKS AS A SIGNALLING DEVICE
A study by Mingfeng Lin, Siva Viswanathan, and N. R. Prabhala of
peer-to-peer (“P2P”) lending found that friendship networks matter because of the social stigma of default, i.e., the disutility suffered by borrowers when friends learn about their default.146 “If social stigma costs
matter, borrowers who perceive themselves as being likely to default
should avoid forming friendships. This makes friendships a credible
signal of default . . . ”147 In other words, a borrower who defaults will
experience some disutility if his friends learn about it, so he will avoid
making friends if he thinks that he will default.
Moreover, in P2P lending, it is not only the fact of having friends
that matter, but the quality of such friends. As discussed by Mingfeng
Lin, Siva Viswanathan, and N. R. Prabhala, friendship is demonstrated
on the website, www.Prosper.com, the largest P2P lending market. Information about friends of borrowers is displayed prominently in the potential borrower’s listing and friends of borrowers are classified into five
levels.
Level 1 is the weakest kind of friendship. To form a friendship, the
inviting member fills out the friend's email address and a short message. Prosper.com sends the invitee an email message that contains a
145.
146.
Major, &
(1998).
147.

Kollock, supra note 144; Yamagishi et al., supra note 103, at 73, 76, 103.
Lin , Viswanathan, & Prabhala, supra note 128, at 2; Jennifer Crocker, Brenda
Claude Steele, Social Stigma, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 504-53
Lin, Viswanathan, & Prabhala, supra note 128, at 2.
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link to join Prosper. The recipient can click on the link to join Prosper.com and establish a friendship. Thus, the presence of a friendship
tie on Prosper.com suggests at the very least, that the two individuals
have each other’s email address, which constitutes offline, non-public
information about each other.148 Level 2 friends are those who have
given enough information to qualify as lenders (e.g., credit history and
income) or as borrowers (e.g., verification of identity and credit history).149 Level 3 friends are those who have actually lent to other borrowers prior to the current listing.150 Level 4 friends are those who have
bid on the borrower’s listing.151 Level 5 friends, the strongest kind of
friends, are those who have bid on the specific borrower’s listing and
have actually made money.152
Mingfeng Lin, Siva Viswanathan, and N. R. Prabhala found that
higher, stronger levels of friendship serve as more credible signals,153
and that having real lender-friends bid on a listing, increase the chances of a successful funding.154 Thus, the stronger and more verifiable a
borrower’s social capital is, the more likely is his loan to be funded, viz.:
The evidence is more consistent with a prism effect in which borrowers’ attributes are reflected in the nature of the company they keep,
i.e., serve as a source of soft information about borrower quality. In
other words, the positive social capital communicated by friends who
bid rather than the direct effect of the money loaned by friends appears to be the major reason why friendship[s] reduce defaults.155

In crowdfunding, friendship networks and social capital could also
be used as signals of quality and trustworthiness. The support of family and friends provides the “first signal as to the credibility of the project to other backers and investors by being the first to back a project.”156 Having a large number of supporters and having these
numbers visible to the public indicate that the project already has a
core group of backers, who can be “easily mobilised as multiplicators
and sales agents within their personal (social) networks.”157

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 3, 12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
Al-Tayar, supra note 121, at 57.
Hemer, supra note 5, at 28.
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In addition, studies have confirmed that family and friends have
lower information asymmetries, that is, they have more information
about the quality of an entrepreneur, than traditional sources of capital.158 Thus, an entrepreneur without a track record can raise capital
more easily from family and friends who have known him for a long
time.159 The fact that family and friends have invested into a venture
conveys to third parties that people who actually know the entrepreneur believe that he is trustworthy and that they can get a return on
their investment.
Friendship networks can be seen, to some degree, in current crowdfunding platforms. In CrowdCube, users can view the names and profile of members who have invested in a start-up. If members who are
highly regarded in the community have invested in a start-up, this can
encourage other members to invest as well.
In Grow VC, users can see the followers of a start-up. However, followers do not necessarily invest in the start-up, nor do investors necessarily follow the start-up. Startups can, but are not required to, share
their Grow VC profiles on their Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn profiles.160 Also, Grow VC does not require them to share or link their Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn profiles to their Grow VC profiles.
It is suggested that relationships of entrepreneurs amongst themselves (e.g., which entrepreneurs are friends with which entrepreneurs),
and entrepreneurs’ relationships with other members of a crowdfunding
platform (e.g., the number and identity of investors in a specific project)
be disclosed to other users of the platform, to serve as signalling devices
of an entrepreneur’s trustworthiness.
C. DISCUSSION BOARDS
Complementing the signals from reputation and friendship networks could be web forums where users can post “problems with proposed ventures, to coax concessions from entrepreneurs prior to
158. Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini, & Avi Goldfarb, Friends, Family, and the Flat
World: The Geography of Crowdfunding 3, (Aug. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~agoldfarb/crowdfunding.pdf; citing DOUGLAS
J. CUMMING & S. A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTING: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2009).
159. Id.
160. Markus Lampinen, Press Release: Social Investor Relationship Management
tools, GROW VC (Dec. 7, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.growvc.com/blog/2011/12/pressrelease-social-investor-relationship-management-tools/.
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investing, and to monitor investments after they invest.” 161 Comments
on a particular entrepreneur, especially feedback on his performance in
prior transactions, form part of his record, which can be accessed by any
user.162 Moreover, if entrepreneurs are able to command higher prices
or receive more contributions because of positive comments, then the
existence of discussion boards themselves provides a “positive incentive
. . . for good performance.”163
Such discussion boards have been found to be effective on peer-topeer lending sites, where users have warned the community of fraudulent borrowers.164 One project for an action video game on Kickstarter
was exposed as fraudulent by members of the Kickstarter community
only two days after the fundraising campaign began.165 In crowdfunding, portals like CrowdCube and Grow VC have very active discussion
boards, with some members even pointing out that the financial projections of some proposals were flawed.166
However, electronic bulletin boards are also susceptible to
spammers or advertisers, and to misleading or inaccurate comments by
users.167 As with reputation systems, these problems can be managed.
For instance, spammers, advertisers, or fraudulent users could be
banned by the forum administrator or kicked out of the crowdfunding
platform.
Another issue with discussion boards is that an early investor may
have an incentive to exaggerate the positive attributes of a project to
encourage other members to invest in that project. However, according
to the rules of crowdfunding portals like Grow VC and CrowdCube, if
the target amount for a pitch is not achieved (i.e., there are not enough
pledges for a pitch), no money is taken from any investor. Therefore, an
early investor who strongly wishes a pitch to succeed may post exaggerated positive comments about that pitch to entice others to invest, and
thereby cause the target amount to be reached. However, if the project
fails (i.e., if the project is not really viable, as he claimed), that early investor will lose his own investment. Therefore, an early investor would
have little incentive to give a positive review unless he sincerely
161. Bradford, supra note 12, at 113.
162. Daniel Houser & John Wooders, Reputation in Auctions: Theory and Evidence
from eBay, 15 J. ECON. AND MGT. STRATEGY 353, 354 (2006).
163. Id.
164. Bradford, supra note 12, at 113.
165. Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, supra note 158, at 28.
166. See e.g., Seriously Bad Practice and Bad Investments, CROWDCUBE (Apr. 19,
2012, 5:06 PM), http://forum.CrowdCube.com/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=687. (“[Two] recently
fully funded pitches . . . both had serious errors in their financial projections and both projected completely fabricated profits as a result.”).
167. Bradford, supra note 12, at 135.
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thought that the project would succeed.
IV. CONCLUSION
As predicted by Kevin Lawton and Dan Marom, authors of The
Crowdfunding Revolution: Social Networking Meets Venture Financing,
in the same way that social networking has changed how we allocate
time, crowdfunding will change how we allocate capital. 168 The conventional ways of capital allocation by a few institutions is being challenged by “a new model of funding which has the potential to tap an
almost unfathomable collective intelligence.”169 If thoughtfully managed, crowdfunding could become an alternative or a complementary
source of financing to early-stage start-ups.170
However, in order for the crowdfunding market to work, it is vital
that information asymmetry be reduced as much as possible to avoid
the lemons problem. Signals conveyed via reputation systems and
friendship networks, as well as comments posted on discussion boards,
can reveal vital facts about entrepreneurs and their proposed projects,
provide more security and peace of mind to potential funders, and allow
investors to harness the wisdom of the crowds.171 After all, the crowd’s
trust is the foundation on which crowdfunding platforms are built.172
Without this confidence, the crowd will simply stay away and invest
their money elsewhere.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This study is intended to raise issues that may arise from information asymmetry in crowdfunding, and perhaps inspire others to propose more solutions. Further studies may establish whether the crowdfunding provisions and implementing rules in the JOBS Act are
sufficient to deal with the information asymmetry problem in the United States crowdfunding market. Studies of the legal systems of other
countries could also be conducted to determine if existing securities

168. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 3, at 1.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Hemer, supra note 5, at 3.
171. Bradford, supra note 12, at 134.
172. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139,
194 (2006).
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laws are sufficient to address the problems of information asymmetry.
In the future, if crowdfunding becomes more widespread, empirical
studies could be done on whether the quality of crowdfunded projects
has increased, remained the same, or deteriorated over time. These
studies might also consider the effect of existing reputation systems and
friendship networks on the ability of a start-up to raise funds over the
Internet.
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